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Religious Dimensions of the Japanese Imperial System 
in the Contemporary Social Situations1
Michiaki OKUYAMA
要　　旨
　2016年 8月に発表された明仁天皇のメッセージ「象徴としてのお務めについての天皇陛下のおこ
とば」は天皇の生前退位についての議論を呼び起こしたが，象徴としての天皇が果たしてきた役割の
なかの宗教的次元についても新たな関心を呼ぶことになった。本稿は，安丸良夫の『近代天皇像の形成』
における議論，島薗進の一連の国家神道論，ベン＝アミー・シロニーの編著 The Emperors of Modern 
Japanにおける天皇論をふまえて，現代天皇制における宗教性について振り返り，特に戦後の皇室と
キリスト教との関係についても確認したうえで，明仁天皇と美智子皇后の宗教性に着目する。その際，
天皇皇后の慰霊と祈りへの取り組みが，宮中祭祀に注目した国家神道論の射程に収まりきらない，重
要な主題となっていることを指摘する。
A New Look at the System of the Symbolic Emperor in 2016
　 Modern emperors in Japan can be a subject of scholarly inquiry from several different perspectives, 
such as history, political science, intellectual history, or political philosophy.  If we take a comparative 
perspective, the Japanese emperor can be studied in comparison with other emperors, kings, or 
monarchs of any other kind or title.  In the case of the Japanese emperor, one characteristic feature of 
his profile is the religious aspect of his roles and activities.
　 The Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, composed of 130 newspaper, broadcasting, 
and communication companies nationwide, awards outstanding press coverage annually.  This year 
(2016) the award was presented to the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai ［NHK］), 
besides other award winners, for their report on Emperor Akihito’s明仁 (1933― ) intention and will to 
abdicate.  Akihito himself broadcast his recorded message through NHK on August 8th, and the Imperial 
Household Agency posted both the text message and the recorded video on its website on the same day. 
1 A panel entitled “Kingship and Religion in the Modern World” was organized for the 21st World Congress of the 
International Association for History of Religions held in Erfurt, Germany, in August 2015. This paper is a revised and 
enlarged version of my presentation at the panel entitled, “Religious Dimensions of the Japanese Imperial System in a 
Post-Secular Society.”
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NHK obtained from an anonymous news source the information about Akihito’s intentions in advance, 
and on July 13th, they broadcast a special television program on this issue as a scoop, which was soon 
judged to be deserving of the above-mentioned annual award.
　 The Imperial Household Agency posted Akihito’s message both in Japanese and in English on its 
website, and some of the excerpts are as follow.
［....］ As we are in the midst of a rapidly aging society, I would like to talk to you today about what 
would be a desirable role of the Emperor in a time when the Emperor, too, becomes advanced in 
age.  While, being in the position of the Emperor, I must refrain from making any specific comments 
on the existing Imperial system, I would like to tell you what I, as an individual, have been thinking 
about.
Ever since my accession to the throne, I have carried out the acts of the Emperor in matters of state, 
and at the same time I have spent my days searching for and contemplating on what is the desirable 
role of the Emperor, who is designated to be the symbol of the State by the Constitution of Japan.
［....］ I am already 80 years old, and fortunately I am now in good health.  However, when I consider 
that my fitness level is gradually declining, I am worried that it may become difficult for me to carry 
out my duties as the symbol of the State with my whole being as I have done until now.
［....］ I have considered that the first and foremost duty of the Emperor is to pray for peace and 
happiness of all the people.  At the same time, I also believe that in some cases it is essential to 
stand by the people, listen to their voices, and be close to them in their thoughts.  In order to carry 
out the duties of the Emperor as the symbol of the State and as a symbol of the unity of the people, 
the Emperor needs to seek from the people their understanding on the role of the symbol of the 
State. ［....］ In my travels throughout the country, which I have made together with the Empress, 
including the time when I was Crown Prince, I was made aware that wherever I went there were 
thousands of citizens who love their local community and with quiet dedication continue to support 
their community.  With this awareness I was able to carry out the most important duties of the 
Emperor, to always think of the people and pray for the people, with deep respect and love for the 
people.  That, I feel, has been a great blessing.
In coping with the aging of the Emperor, I think it is not possible to continue reducing perpetually 
the Emperor’s acts in matters of state and his duties as the symbol of the State. ［....］ When the 
Emperor has ill health and his condition becomes serious, I am concerned that, as we have seen in 
the past, society comes to a standstill and people’s lives are impacted in various ways.  The practice 
in the Imperial Family has been that the death of the Emperor called for events of heavy mourning, 
continuing every day for two months, followed by funeral events which continue for one year. 
These various events occur simultaneously with events related to the new era, placing a very heavy 
strain on those involved in the events, in particular, the family left behind.  It occurs to me from time 
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to time to wonder whether it is possible to prevent such a situation.
As I said in the beginning, under the Constitution, the Emperor does not have powers related to 
government.  Even under such circumstances, it is my hope that by thoroughly reflecting on our 
country’s long history of emperors, the Imperial Family can continue to be with the people at all 
times and can work together with the people to build the future of our country, and that the duties 
of the Emperor as the symbol of the State can continue steadily without a break. ［....］
(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/page/okotoba/detailEn/12)
　 Several important points are clearly stated here.  First, as the symbol of the state and the symbol of 
the unity of the people, Akihito refrains from making any comments on the existing imperial system. 
Secondly, Akihito considers that the most important duty of the emperor is to think of the people and 
to pray for the peace and happiness of the people, and he hopes this duty will continue.  Third, as he 
grows older, now being over eighty years old, he worries that his fitness may someday prevent him 
from carrying out his duties, and that if he becomes seriously ill, it might affect people’s lives in some 
negative way.  Fourth, Akihito wonders if the heavy strain caused by the practices in the imperial 
family of the funerals and of the enthronement can be reduced.
　 These points of Akihito’s message have aroused an active debate on the role of the emperor as the 
symbol of the state.  Since there is no legal nor constitutional procedure dealing with the emperor’s 
abdication, whether or not he can abdicate at all is a big question.  If a procedure could be made so 
that Akihito could abdicate, what kind of legal and/or constitutional changes would be necessary? 
But if any changes are made following Akihito’s message, wouldn’t this mean that his voice has had 
some political influence on the legislative process of the state? With a number of questions and doubts 
emerging, the debate may continue for the next few years.
　 The general reactions among the Japanese people have been to show sympathy toward the aging 
emperor, and the majority of people seem to agree with his abdication.  According to news coverage 
in the months following his announcement, the government has started to study the possibility of 
legislating special measures for the present emperor’s abdication, without any major changes to 
the existing Constitution and the Imperial Household Law.  Any major legislative reforms to the 
Constitution or the Imperial Household Law would take several years, and thinking about Akihito’s 
age, it would be unrealistic.
　 One important point to consider here is that although the emperor is constitutionally stipulated 
as the symbol of the state, the meaning of the “symbol” has not been defined in any clear way.  In 
addition, as for the duties of the emperor, Akihito takes praying for the people to be essential, 
but praying for the people is not an official duty of the emperor.  Praying for the people has been 
something Akihito has devoted himself to personally, and as long as the emperor himself is a public 
figure, his prayers can be regarded as something public, if not official.
　 Akihito’s message given in August 2016 has brought public attention to the emperor’s role, and his 
role as a figure who prays has become one focal point.  We are now at a point where we should think 
anew the religious dimensions of the Japanese emperor in contemporary social situations.
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The Modern Japanese Emperor as a Subject of Inquiry
　 Yasumaru Yoshio安丸良夫 , a historian specializing in modern Japan, published a monograph featuring 
historical images of the modern imperial system in 1992.  His book, Kindai tennō zō no keisei近代天皇像
の形成 (The making of the images of the modern emperors) summarizes basic ideas about the modern 
emperor system hypothetically in four points:
1．The emperor as a living divinity in human form in one unbroken hereditary line from time 
immemorial, and the absolute and eternal order that systematizes hierarchy with the emperor at 
the summit;
2．The idea of theocracy as illustrated in the unification of ritual and administration;
3．The mission of the emperor and Japan to reign the world;
4．The emperor as a charismatic political leader to lead the civilizational enlightenment of modern 
Japan. (Yasumaru 1992 (2007), 13)
　 These points represent the religious character of the modern emperor system.  According to 
Yasumaru, these four ideas appeared as a cohesive whole in the late-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth 
centuries.  The first three points above were declared by Motoori Norinaga本居宣長 , both the Mito 
Learning and National Learning schools, and reactionary nationalist movements.  The fourth point 
was added by the modern enlightenment policy (ibid., 13―14).
　 Yasumaru’s book deals with the process of creating the images of the emperor in modern Japan. 
This focus basically excludes contemporary images of the emperor, but the very last section of the 
final chapter deals with the issue of “the contemporary imperial system,” especially after the defeat 
of World War II.  Yasumaru’s final remarks about what the contemporary imperial system means in 
modern Japan, and what roles it could play, summarize his critical view about it.
　 According to Yasumaru, after the defeat of the war, the imperial system―with a living divinity and 
the mission to rule the world as its components―was smoothly removed of its fanatical elements and 
its delusionary insistence on the superiority of the Japanese national polity over other nations.  Then, 
after the war, it accommodated itself to an era when Japanese people focused on material civilization 
and consumerism.  That said, however, Yasumaru judges that the imperial system functions to 
organize the nation state, representing the uppermost authoritative dimension, which is taboo.  The 
imperial system is taboo, in his judgement, because it should be secluded in ritualistic ways from 
impurity, evil, and misfortune (ibid., 308).  This system of keeping the order has continued to exist 
because contemporary Japanese society requires the principle of order that is enabled by division, 
discrimination, and exclusion (ibid., 309).  Yasumaru continues:
Each sub-group in Japanese society, which is organized based on the characteristics, abilities, and 
achievements of their members, have no relation with the imperial system at all.  They aspire, on 
the other hand, to be evaluated and authorized in reference to the general and universal dimensions 
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of the nation, and their aspiration will lead to the emperor at the summit of the hierarchy of 
evaluation and authorization.  If someone ignores or rejects the evaluation and authorization of this 
kind as something unrelated to one’s own tasks or achievements that he or she performs in their 
own sub-group, then this person will be judged as a stranger who is difficult to co-operate with and 
to sympathize with. (Ibid., 310)
In contemporary Japan, enterprises, organizations, and individuals act as they please, seemingly 
very freely, to satisfy their own desires, but in fact this freedom is given conditionally in exchange 
for belonging to the nation and living in the national order.  The nation thus establishes the 
unification of itself, by wedging the anchor deep in the people’s consciousness, and by mobilizing 
national vitality, through appearing to hand freedom to the people. ［....］ It ［the emperor system］ 
is a mirror through which we see ourselves as belonging firmly to the nation state of Japan under 
the appearance, or delusion, that we are free.  Accordingly, it is this monument of disgrace that 
challenges us, we who aspire to live freely. (Ibid., 311)
　 The emperor system has been a subject of inquiry not only among Japanese scholars but among 
foreign scholars as well.  In contrast with Yasumaru’s severely critical view of the imperial system, 
the editor of a collection of essays entitled The Emperors of Modern Japan, Ben-Ami Shillony, seems to 
take a more sympathetic standpoint.  As for leadership in the modernization process of Japan, Shillony 
differentiates the sacred monarch and collective leadership.  He does not see a charismatic dictator in 
the emperor.  He summarizes the function of the emperor, especially Emperor Meiji, as follows:
The emperor legitimized what the ruling group of politicians, military men, senior bureaucrats 
and imperial advisers had agreed upon in advance.  He was rarely expected to choose between 
conflicting recommendations or to formulate his own policies. (Shillony 2008a, 2)
　 As for the postwar situation surrounding the emperor and the nation, Shillony characterizes Japan 
as “the only modern country in the world in which the monarchy survived defeat and still exists 
today,” and also as “the only country today that has an emperor, despite the fact that Japan is not an 
empire anymore” (ibid., 3).  If this is so, the exceptional monarch, that is Japan, should present an 
interesting case study in its own right.
　 This volume edited by Shillony contains a chapter entitled “State Shinto and Emperor Veneration” 
written by Shimazono Susumu島薗進 .  Shimazono has published a number of essays focusing on “State 
Shinto” in addition to this chapter.  One topic in his argument is the relationship between the emperor 
and State Shinto.  Now we turn to Shimazono’s arguments on this relationship by reviewing a couple 
of articles written by him.
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Shimazono on the Emperor within the Framework of State Shinto
　 Here I summarize some features of Shimazono’s argument of State Shinto in general, and also 
focus, in particular, on the place of the emperor in the framework of his argument.2  Although he has 
published a number of essays on this subject in Japanese, here I concentrate on his essays written in 
English.
　 In his 2005 article that appeared in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Shimazono 
first points out the ambiguous usage of the term “State Shinto” in the so-called Shinto Directive. 
The Shinto Directive is an abbreviated way to refer to the memorandum issued on December 
15th, 1945 by the General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the 
Imperial Japanese Government, on the subject of “Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, 
Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto (Kokka Shintō, Jinja Shintō).”3  As the words 
in the parentheses show, “State Shinto” can be understood in this directive as the translation of the 
Japanese, Kokka Shintō 国家神道 or Jinja Shintō 神社神道 .  This title itself suggests, in essence, the 
problems of the terminology of State Shinto in its relation to Kokka Shintō and also Jinja Shintō (Shrine 
Shinto), and of the inter-relationship among these three concepts.  Shimazono himself reviews the 
arguments regarding the concept of State Shinto, especially in the Shinto Directive, which I will not 
delve into here in detail.  A basic direction that Shimazono takes in this article is to differentiate the 
narrow meaning and the broad meaning of the term “State Shinto.” These two usages of the term are 
both used in the Shinto Directive, seemingly without a conscious differentiation.  Thus Shimazono 
here tries to differentiate clearly between the two.
　 Shimazono first traces the arguments presented by such scholars in Shinto studies as Ashizu 
Uzuhiko葦津珍彦 and Sakamoto Koremaru阪本是丸 , pointing out that they take the narrow usage 
of “State Shinto” based on the prewar official―legal and administrative―treatment by the Japanese 
government of Shrine Shinto. Jinja (Shrine Shinto) was treated separately from Kyōha Shintō教派神道 
(Sect Shinto) by the government.  The clear point of differentiation in legalization between shrines and 
Sect Shinto can be seen in the establishment in 1900 of the two different administration bureaus: one 
exclusively for Shrines (Jinja-kyoku神社局 ), the other for religions in general, including Sect Shinto 
(Shūkyō-kyoku宗教局 ).
　 According to Shimazono, the representative of the broad definition of State Shinto can be seen 
in Murakami Shigeyoshi’s村上重良 book Kokka Shintō (1970).  Inserting a couple of citations from 
Murakami’s book, Shimazono summarizes Murakami’s theory on State Shinto as follows:
Murakami, utilizing typological concept of religious studies, argues that State Shinto was the 
religious-political institution inheriting the old Shinto tradition of Japan’s ethnic religion which were 
2 For a general overview of recent Japanese scholarship on “State Shinto,” including Shimazono, see Okuyama (2011).
3 For the text of the Shinto Directive, see, for example, “Directive for the Disestablishment of State Shinto, 15 December 
1945,” in Mullins et al. (1993, 97―102).
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revived by Meiji Restoration in the 1860s and dominated the religious system of modern Japan over 
a period of about 80 years until 1945. ［....］
　 Murakami considers State Shinto to consist of Shrine Shinto, Imperial House Shinto, and the 
Kokutai (National Polity) Doctrine which advocates that Japan has a unique state system from 
ancient times based upon Emperor worship.  He also assumes that this system has infiltrated 
into every person’s consciousness.  He further views Sect Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity as 
authorized religions that were subordinated to State Shinto and played due roles to supplement the 
function of State Shinto.  He expresses the whole in the term “State Shinto System.” (Shimazono 
2005, 1083)
　 Shimazono’s basic standpoint is to take the broad definition, because it will enable us to take into 
consideration, besides Shrine Shinto, the cult and worship of the emperor, and the rituals and concepts 
around Amaterasu Ōmikami天照大神 , deemed as the ancestor of the emperor (ibid., 1084).
　 Shimazono discusses the concept of “religion” and related ideas, such as rites and teachings, in the 
modern Japanese context, and tries to situate Shinto in the configuration of these spheres.  He traces 
the development of State Shinto by paying attention to its substance and styles of propagation.  He also 
refers to the recent arguments on nationalism, and characterizes State Shinto as one type of modern 
nationalism that has a close connection with a religious tradition.
　 According to Shimazono, the religious structure of modern Japan― “religious” in a broad sense
―can be summarized as one comprised of two strata.  On the state and national level, State Shinto 
administered “indoctrination” and “rites and rituals.” And at the individual level, “religions,” in the 
narrow definition of the word, dealt with salvation, the concerns of life and death, and other aspects 
of daily living (ibid., 1094).  As for this dual structure, Shimazono explains that “State Shinto and 
other religions coexisted based on a relation of a kind of division of roles” (ibid.).  He suggests that 
this model of the dual structure of religion can be useful to grasp the transformation of the religious 
structure from the early modern (mid-sixteenth century to the Meiji Restoration) to the modern 
period (Meiji Restoration onwards).  As for the early modern period, the duality can be seen in the 
Shogunate power that sanctified the dominance of the warlords over Buddhism and other religions 
and sects (though Christianity was suppressed) (ibid., 1095―96).  He then states that “［t］here was 
continuity from the early modern era through the modern era of Japan in the dual structure consisting 
of a system for sanctifying the worldly ruling system emphasizing the hierarchy, and religions and 
sects taking care of individuals’ salvation and life-and-death affairs (ibid., 1096).
　 In this 2005 article, Shimazono did not elaborate much on the postwar situation surrounding 
Japanese religions.  He then published a book chapter entitled “State Shinto and Religion in Post-War 
Japan” in 2007.  Here I only focus on his arguments that can be regarded as something developed 
from his earlier essay.  In the beginning of this essay, Shimazono states that the postwar Japanese 
state “not only has a special relationship with Shinto but it is also integrated by it,” additionally asking 
the question, “In these circumstances, can we say that Japanese society is completely secular?” 
(Shimazono 2007, 697)
　 He first pays special attention to one “very important component of Shinto which is sometimes 
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overlooked in descriptions of religion in Japan today” (ibid., 698), that is “Imperial House Shinto.” 
This Shinto is composed of the private rituals of the Imperial family, mainly performed in the Imperial 
Palace in Tokyo using three altars.  In these rituals, the emperor plays the role of high priest (ibid.). 
In addition, “the Ise Shrine whose main deity is the Goddess Amaterasu, the ancestor of the Imperial 
House, became the central sacred place for the state” (ibid., 699).
　 In Shimazono’s view, one thing that the Shinto Directive issued in 1945 did not pay much attention 
to was Imperial House Shinto, though this “had often been considered as essential components 
of State Shinto” (ibid., 700).  Then the question arises as to the postwar situation, “whether ‘State 
Shinto’ had really been dissolved and, if so, in what respects” (ibid.).  Shimazono summarizes the 
basic idea of the Occupation policy regarding the status of Imperial House Shinto: “If a system was to 
set up to ensure that no group could use the rites for political purposes, Imperial House rites would 
remain matters of private belief which would presumably not exercise much influence over people’s 
lives” (ibid., 702).
　 Shimazono then discusses the situation of Imperial House Shinto following the Occupation period 
under four categories:
1．Daily and seasonal rites in the Imperial House;
2．Rites of passage for the emperor and other family members;
3．The three sacred treasures (the sacred mirror, sword, and the curved jewel) and imperial 
graves;
4．The relationship with Shrine Shinto (especially with Ise Shrine, the ancestral mausoleum of the 
Imperial House).
　 I do not delve into these four issues here, but the important question should be how these items 
are connected to the postwar state of Japan.  Basically, in the postwar years, the Imperial House rituals 
have been conducted as private events, and therefore, the national treasury does not make budgetary 
allocations for these rituals.  But as for the personnel who work for the Imperial House rituals, there 
remains some overlap between private and state affairs.  Shimazono mentions that “［r］itualists are 
regarded as employees of the Imperial House and are paid from the budgeted allowances for its 
private expenditure, but chamberlains are employees of the government” (ibid.).
　 Shimazono then pays attention to the Association of Shinto Shrines, “the umbrella organization 
of Shinto shrines across Japan” (ibid., 704), which was established after the war, in 1946, as a private 
religious organization.  As for the political agenda of the association, he explains:
This association has developed as a politically oriented organisation having the state and the 
Emperor as its main preoccupations rather than as a force for uniting folk beliefs in shrines at 
a national level.  With belief oriented towards State Shinto (in the broad sense of the term) as 
its religious principle, the Association adopted the aim of strengthening both reverence for the 
Emperor within a Shinto frame of reference and partnership between the Emperor and shrines. 
(Ibid.)
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　 According to Shimazono, “reverence for the Emperor, the Imperial House and the Grand Shrine 
of Ise is the highest aim ［of the Association］; and it constitutes the axis of its belief system” (ibid.). 
This is clearly illustrated with the Charter of the Association formulated in 1980.  Shimazono cites its 
first three articles:
Article 1　The Association of Shinto Shrines shall place value on tradition, promote rites and 
rituals, and enhance moral principles, pray for the permanent prosperity of the Emperor’s reign, and 
at the same time contribute to peace in the world.
Article 2
(1) The Association of Shinto Shrines shall revere the grand Shrine of Ise as its head shrine, and 
shall sincerely devote itself to the work of the Grand Shrine.
(2) The Association of Shinto Shrines shall be engaged in services for the prosperity of all Shinto 
shrines and shall convey the gods’ power of commanding love and respect.
Article 3　The Association of Shinto Shrines shall initiate an educational doctrine of revering the 
gods and respecting the Emperor, and uphold the platform for its practice.  It shall train Shinto 
priests, and educate parishioners and followers. (Ibid.)
　 Since “［t］he Association strongly advocates reverence towards the Emperor and the Ise Shrine; 
and it argues that all shrines in Japan should be integrated under the Grand Shrine of Ise and the 
Emperor,” Shimazono insists that “the Association is rightly regarded as pursuing a form of Shinto 
that leans towards State Shinto in its broad meaning” (ibid., 705).  Among the political campaigns 
conducted by the association, Shimazono mentions, with a U.S. scholar Kenneth Ruof f, the 
establishment of National Foundation Day (February 11th; based on a mythical day of enthronement of 
the first Emperor Jinmu神武 ) and the enactment of the use of the reign-name in dates (such as Meiji
明治 or Shōwa昭和 ) as successful cases (ibid., 706).
　 In Shimazono’s view, these two examples―the Imperial House Shinto rituals and the political 
agenda of the Association of Shinto Shrines―show the revitalization of State Shinto in the postwar 
period.  In short, “［t］aken together, these two projects constitute the core of today’s State Shinto 
within the current framework of law” (ibid.).  He then refers to a couple of intellectuals who support 
the restoration of State Shinto, such as Mishima Yukio三島由紀夫 or Nakanishi Terumasa中西輝政 
(political scientist) (ibid., 707).
　 Shimazono concludes his essay as follows:
Thus, it has been widely accepted that State Shinto was dissolved and had become extinct just after 
the end of the World War II.  In reality, however, State Shinto has survived to play an important part 
in post-war Japan and has even been gaining more influence in recent times.  In order to correct 
these misunderstandings about the religious system of post-war Japan we need to re-think such 
basic concepts as religion, Shinto and State Shinto. (Ibid., 707―8)
　 After he published these two essays, Shimazono extended his scope in his 2008 essay entitled 
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“State Shinto and Emperor Veneration,” which appeared in the above-mentioned book edited by Ben-
Ami Shillony, by following the historical development from the Tokugawa period, through the Meiji 
Restoration, to the Pacific War period, of such concepts as kokutai国体 (National Polity) and kōdō 皇
道 (Shimazono 2008).
　 In the next essay, published in 2009 and entitled “State Shinto in the Lives of the People: The 
Establishment of Emperor Worship, Modern Nationalism, and Shrine Shinto in Late Meiji,” 
Shimazono traces the development of the following three systems:
1．The ritual system for revering the sacred emperor and the imperial house;
2．The system of education and propagation of Kokutai thought, which took root in the life space of 
the people; and
3．The training system for Shrine Shinto and shrine priests.
(Shimazono 2009a, 120)
　 He argues that through the historical process of the development of these systems, “State 
Shinto penetrated the lives of the people” (ibid., 93).  Shimazono begins this article by presenting a 
bibliographical survey of arguments on State Shinto after Murakami Shigeyoshi, and then goes on to 
present a historical overview of State Shinto, focusing on “the establishment period” of State Shinto. 
His periodization follows Murakami’s idea of dividing the four periods of the history of State Shinto, 
but changes slightly as to how to call each period.  These four periods are named “the formative 
period” (1868―1890, the same wording as Murakami’s), “the establishment period” (1890―1910), “the 
penetration period” (1910―1931), and “the fascist period” (1931―1945).  The three systems mentioned 
above during the establishment period are the major subject of this article.4
　 In the conclusion of this 2009 essay, Shimazono points out the merit of using the concept of State 
Shinto.  He finds this preferable to a concept such as “imperial ideology” because the latter depends 
too much on elite discourse, while the former can take into consideration the religious consciousness 
of people at various levels of society (ibid., 120―21).
　 These four essays on State Shinto in English somehow summarize Shimazono’s arguments on 
the same subject written in Japanese.  Among them, the 2007 essay in particular gives the readers 
his original view about postwar situations regarding State Shinto.  If we compare this view of his with 
another argument that he made in a different context, his idea of postwar State Shinto will present 
another meaning in its own right.
　 In 2008, the University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy organized a symposium with Jean Baubérot, 
a French sociologist of religion, as a keynote speaker on the subject of secularization and “laïcité,” and 
its proceedings were published both in Japanese and French the next year.  Shimazono contributed 
an essay entitled “Secularization and the Concept of Religion in Japan” (Shimazono 2009b), where 
he discusses the applicability of the concept of secularization or “laïcité” in Japan.  According to 
4 In this article, which was translated by Regan E. Murphy, Shimazono introduces the concept of “Court Shinto,” 
instead of “Imperial House Shinto” that he used in his 2005 essay.
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Shimazono, there are four hypotheses regarding secularization in Japanese history, each of which he 
thinks seem reasonable to some extent.
　 First, when the Shogunate power established itself in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
it subordinated Buddhism and oppressed Christianity, whereas more secular Confucian or Shinto 
doctrines became prevalent and influential in the public domain of society.  Second, the Meiji 
Restoration introduced modern social institutions with enlightening rationality and scientific 
knowledge, resulting in the establishment of freedom of religion, including Christianity, which actually 
was conditional and limited so as not to come into conflict with the emerging system of State Shinto. 
Third, after World War II, the occupation policy promoted secularization by dismantling State Shinto 
and establishing freedom of religion more thoroughly.  That said, Shimazono continues, even after 
this third point of the postwar reforms, secularization has not been completed, which is his fourth 
hypothesis and seems to be his own opinion.  Here his argument on secularization meets with his view 
of postwar State Shinto.5
　 As mentioned above, Shimazono thinks that State Shinto has remained even after the war, 
and on this very point, he insists that secularization in Japan is not complete.  It is true that Japan 
experienced important transformations in its political and social systems in three periods, comparable 
to secularization in Western societies.  According to Shimazono, even if it is true, postwar Japan has 
kept the religious elements that he regards as State Shinto.  Following the line that Shimazono has 
been elaborating, we can probably argue that through the modernization process, Japan experienced 
secularization to some extent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Meiji Restoration 
period, and the postwar occupation policy that brought about reforms in religions.  However, religious 
influences still remain even in the present after the partly-realized secularization in the above-
mentioned three different historical settings.
Religious Surroundings of the Current Emperor and Empress
　 When Shimazono discusses the postwar continuation of State Shinto, one example is Imperial 
House Shinto with its series of court rituals, and another is political campaigns and the involvement of 
the Association of Shinto Shrines.  Here I will focus on the postwar situation surrounding the emperor.
　 Ben-Ami Shillony contributed the introduction and two chapters to the volume he edited, The 
Emperors of Modern Japan.  One chapter, “Conservative Dissatisfaction with the Modern Emperors,” 
deals with the relationship between Japanese nationalists and the emperors.  Regarding the postwar 
situation, especially in relation to religions, Shillony briefly mentions Hirohito’s裕仁 (Emperor Shōwa, 
1901―1989) relationship with Christianity and Yasukuni Shrine, and then moves on to the case of 
Akihito, the current emperor, and his family.  The section about Akihito is entitled “Dissatisfaction 
with Akihito,” meaning his unpopularity among conservatives and the right wing.  According to 
5 In the latter part of this essay, Shimazono discusses the limits of the Western concept of “religion,” which I skip here 
in this article.
Religious Dimensions of the Japanese Imperial System in the Contemporary Social Situations12
Shillony, Akihito is less popular than Emperor Shōwa for several reasons, among which “his liberal 
and pacifist education” and “his marriage to a commoner, Shōda Michiko正田美智子 (1934― )” are 
mentioned (Shillony 2008b, 152).  Criticism of the current emperor and his family comes not only 
from the conservative nationalists but also from Hamao Minoru濱尾実 , “the Catholic chamberlain 
and tutor of Akihito and his children from 1951―1971,” especially in the early years of the reign of 
Akihito (ibid., 152―53).6  For Hamao, Akihito and his family do not seem to sympathize with the 
people’s sorrow enough.  Shillony himself seems to side with critics regarding the lavish lifestyle of 
the imperial family:
The imperial couple went to console disaster victims, but did not give up its luxurious lifestyle.  After 
the devastating Kobe earthquake of 1995, Akihito and Michiko visited the victims and hugged their 
children, but that same year a new palace was built for them at the cost of 50 million dollars. (Ibid., 
153)7
　 Shillony also mentions Akihito’s seemingly liberal and pacifist leanings that disappoint or irritate the 
conservatives, and goes on to review some criticism not only about Crown Prince Naruhito徳仁 and 
his wife, Crown Princess Masako雅子 , but about Prince Akishino秋篠宮 as well.  The dissatisfaction 
toward the current emperor and his family among the conservative nationalists, in Shillony’s view, 
has led to a loss of awe for the imperial institution among some nationalists (ibid., 157―59).  Shillony 
concludes his chapter by mentioning the birth of Prince Hisahito in 2006 (which means the birth of 
a possible future emperor, the first time in over forty years after the birth of Akishino in 1965), which 
dampened a controversy about the succession rule of the throne that is restricted to males under 
Imperial Household Law.  The general impression concerning Akihito and his family written in this 
chapter is unexpectedly severe, because, as I mention below, the image of the current emperor and 
empress seems to have improved in the last few years, probably after the publication of Shillony’s 
volume.
　 The other chapter written by Shillony in the same volume is entitled “Emperors and Christianity.” 
He begins this chapter with the following paragraph:
Although one would expect a wide gap to exist between the emperors of Japan―allegedly the 
descendants and high priests of the sun goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami―and Christianity, which 
regards polytheistic religions as pagan creeds, the modern emperors of Japan and their family 
6 Hamao’s father Shirō 四郎 (1896―1935, a lawyer, member of the House of Peers, and detective fiction writer) was born 
as Katō Terumaro’s加藤照麿 (1863―1925) fourth son, and adopted by Hamao Arata濱尾新 (1849―1925), who served 
successively as the president of the Tokyo Imperial University, the Minister of Education, and the Director of the 
Imperial Prince’s Household Affairs. Katō Terumaro was a medical doctor in the Imperial Household Ministry, whose 
father was Katō Hiroyuki加藤弘之 (1836―1916), who served successively as the president of the Imperial University 
before Hamao Arata, and the president of the Imperial Academy. Katō Terumaro’s sixth son, adopted by the Fukurawa 
family, became the very famous comedian Furukawa Roppa古川ロッパ (1903―61).
7 The new palace was actually constructed in 1993, not in 1995, and has been inhabited since December 1993.
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members have shown an interest in the religion of the west.  Christian officials and educators have 
occupied senior positions in the palace since the Taishō period, despite the nationalistic atmosphere 
of the 1930s and 1940s, and this phenomenon has widened after the Second World War. (Shillony 
2008c, 163)
　 Focusing only on the postwar situation, a couple of interesting episodes are presented.  General 
Douglas MacAr thur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), was a devout 
Episcopalian, supported Christian missionaries coming from the United States, wishing himself to 
convert the Japanese nation into Christianity.  Shillony continues:
The quickest way to convert the Japanese nation was to first convert the imperial family.  An 
imperial conversion could also improve Hirohito’s image abroad, remove the danger of his 
dismissal, and ensure the continuity of the dynasty.  When State Shinto was disbanded in December 
1945, the emperor’s religion became his private affair. ［....］ That seemed to mean that the emperor, 
as a private citizen, was free to adopt any religion, including Christianity. (Ibid., 172)
　 Here are a few examples that show the relationship between Christianity and the Imperial House. 
Prince Asaka Yasuhiko朝香宮鳩彦 , an uncle of Hirohito, was baptized to Catholicism in 1951 together 
with his wife and children (ibid., 174).  Hirohito started inviting Christian lecturers to the palace shortly 
after the war.  Uemura Tamaki植村環 , the president of the Young Women’s Christian Association of 
Japan, provided weekly Bible lessons to the empress and her three daughters for four years (ibid., 175). 
Hirohito visited the French missionary Joseph Flaujac in Nasu in 1947, welcomed Cardinal Francis 
Spellman of New York in 1948, and visited the Catholic writer Nagai Takashi 永 井隆 in Nagasaki in 
1949 (ibid., 175―76).8
　 As for the educational surroundings for Hirohito’s two sons, Shillony gives detailed information. 
In 1947, a Christian educator, Abe Yoshishige 安 倍 能 成 , was appointed president of Gakushūin
学 習 院 .  The theologian Mitani Takamasa’s 三 谷 隆 正 brother, Mitani Takanobu 三 谷 隆 信 , a 
Christian diplomat, was appointed the school’s vice president, and then became the emperor’s great 
chamberlain.  In 1948, a Quaker businessman, Tajima Michiji 田島道治 , was appointed director of 
the Imperial Household Agency.  Tajima appointed Koizumi Shinzō 小 泉 信 三 , who converted to 
Christianity after the war, as the chamberlain in charge of Akihito’s education.  In 1950, a Catholic 
jurist, Tanaka Kōtarō 田中耕太郎 , was appointed Akihito’s tutor on constitutional affairs.  In 1951, a 
Catholic educator, Hamao Minoru, was appointed a personal tutor of Akihito.9  Shillony then mentions 
Elizabeth Gray Vining:
8 The Imperial Household Agency made the official account of the Emperor Showa’s life, Shōwa Tennō Jitsuroku昭和天
皇実録 , open to the public in 2014, and started the publication of 19 volumes in 2015, which will supposedly continue 
until 2019. There are a number of episodes regarding the imperial family’s relation with Christianity, especially during 
the occupation period. Hara Takeshi原武史 presents renewed information on this topic (Hara 2015, 188―205)
9 Hamao’s younger brother Hamao Fumio濱尾文郎 would be made a Cardinal by John Paul II in 2003.
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Akihito’s most influential Christian teacher was Elizabeth Gray Vining, who was appointed in 1946 
to be his English tutor.  Although there were many linguists among the occupation personnel who 
were qualified to fill the position, MacArthur brought Mrs. Vining all the way from Philadelphia 
because she was meant to be more than a language teacher.  Vining was a devout Quaker, and 
Philadelphia was the center of the Quaker movement from where missionaries had been coming to 
Japan since 1885. (Ibid., 177―78)
　 Other Christian relations surrounding the imperial family include the following.  Prince Mikasa三
笠宮 is Hirohito’s youngest brother, and Mikasa’s eldest son, Tomohito寛仁 , married a catholic, Asō 
Nobuko麻生信子 .  Nobuko is the granddaughter of Yoshida Shigeru吉田茂 (prime minister: 1946―
1947, 1948―1954), and her elder brother is Asō Tarō 麻生太郎 (prime minister, 2008―2009).
　 As for the marriage of Akihito and Shōda Michiko, Shillony pays attention to Koizumi Shinzō’s 
matching role.  Shillony summarizes Michiko’s religious background as follows:
Michiko’s family was Catholic and her entire education, from the Futaba elementary school to the 
University of the Sacred Heart, had been Catholic.  She was the valedictorian of her 1957 graduating 
class, and in 1958 she was sent to Brussels to represent her Catholic university at an international 
conference of Catholic schools.  Was she herself a Catholic? The official version was that she had 
not been baptized, and therefore was not a Christian.  This would mean that her parents ignored the 
binding Code of Canon Law, which obliges Catholic parents to baptize their children. (Ibid., 180)
　 It is widely known that Michiko had difficulty in adjusting herself to court life after her marriage. 
This caused her depression, and to deal with this situation, “a woman psychiatrist, Kamiya Mieko神
谷美恵子 , the daughter of the Christian education minister Maeda Tamon前田多門 , was summoned 
to treat her.  Kamiya stayed with Michiko for more than six years and became her closest friend and 
adviser” (ibid., 181).10  Shillony adds a few more Catholic acquaintances close to the emperor and 
empress, and also mentions that Masako attended the Futaba Catholic elementary and middle schools 
in Tokyo (ibid., 183).
　 After all these interests in and connections with Christianity among the imperial family members, 
they have not converted.  This does not mean, however, that the current emperor and empress in 
particular only keep the Shinto tradition within their own roles.  If we review the most recent reports 
surrounding their activities, a new image with some religious aura will seem to appear around them.
Religious Images of Akihito and Michiko after the 2011 Disaster
　 When Shillony published his volume in 2008, he painted a negative portrait of the current emperor 
10 “The Christian education minister” in this citation means that he was the minister of education briefly after the war 
(1945―1946), and became a Quaker.
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and his family alongside the conservative nationalists.  Shillony himself seems to some extent to 
take sides with the nationalists.  Aside from conservative nationalists, what kind of attitude does the 
general public hold toward the emperor and his family?  We can take some hints from the nationwide 
surveys that have been conducted regularly.
　 There are two kinds of nationwide surveys that are conducted regularly regarding Japanese 
people’s general attitudes toward society and the world.  One is the survey conducted by the Institute 
of Statistical Mathematics, a national research institute, on “the Japanese National Character.” This 
survey has been conducted every five years since 1953, and the survey in 2013 was the thirteenth 
occasion.  The other is the survey conducted by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 
a public research institute under the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), on “Japanese Value 
Orientations.” This survey has been conducted every five years since 1973, and the survey in 2013 
was the ninth occasion.  The NHK survey conducted through personal interviews contains a simple 
question that asks people’s attitudes or sentiments toward the emperor which shows the very basic 
tendency of the general public toward the emperor of the time.  The results of this question in the 
survey are as follows.
Question: How do you feel about the emperor now? Choose one of the four choices.
(Numbers indicate the percentages among the valid responses.)
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013
Number 
of valid 
responses
4,243 4,240 4,064 3,853 3,814 3,622 3,319 3,103 3,070
I respect 
him.
33.3 30.2 29.3 27.5 20.5 19.2 20.2 24.7 34.2
I like him. 20.3 21.9 20.9 22.1 42.7 34.5 41.0 33.5 35.3
I don’t feel 
anything.
42.7 44.1 46.4 46.5 33.7 44.2 36.3 38.6 28.4
I dislike 
him.
2.2 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.5
(Other) 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
(DK or NA) 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.6 0.9 1.6 2.1 1.5
(Source: “Dai kyū-kai ‘Nihonjin no ishiki’ chōsa 2013 kekka no gaiyō” 第 9回「日本人の意識」調査（2013）結果の概要 , 
http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/social/pdf/140520.pdf)
　 The results look very simple, but still tells something about general attitudes toward the emperors. 
Since Emperor Shōwa (Hirohito) died in 1989, the surveys until 1988 concerned Emperor Shōwa, 
and those since then have concerned the current emperor (Akihito).  As for “respect,” Emperor 
Shōwa appeared to have been given much respect compared to the current emperor, but the respect 
toward the latter has grown to surpass that of the former.  On the other hand, the current emperor 
has maintained a favorable impression (“I like him”), higher than his father. “Dislike” seems to be 
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slightly higher toward Emperor Shōwa than toward the current emperor.  If we compare the results of 
2008 and 2013, the number of respondents stating that they respect the emperor increased by almost 
ten percentage points, and those indicating no feeling or no interest decreased by over ten percentage 
points.  If we ask what happened between 2008 and 2013, we can easily imagine the effect of the 2011 
earthquake and its aftermath.  I will turn my focus to a certain role that the emperor and empress 
have been performing till today.
　 According to the official website of the Imperial Household Agency, the imperial family members 
are supposed to perform “Official Duties and Public Activities.”11  The “Official Duties and Public 
Activities” contains three subcategories: “Official Duties and Public Activities in the Imperial 
Palace”; “Official Visits within Japan”; and “Fostering friendly relations with foreign countries.” 
Their Japanese website has the category gokōmu nadoご公務など , with the implication that nado 
means something other than official or public roles or activities.  This nado is supposed to mean “the 
Ritual Ceremonies of the Imperial Palace,” which should be understood as the activities performed 
personally by the imperial family, and not supported financially by the national budget.  This is a major 
component of the Imperial House Shinto that Shimazono pays attention to as a sign of the postwar 
survival of State Shinto.  The English website of the Imperial Household Agency omits the delicate 
treatment that can be seen on the Japanese website with the term nado.  On the English website, “the 
Ritual Ceremonies of the Imperial Palace” is simply situated under the category of “Official Duties and 
Public Activities in the Imperial Palace,” which makes “the Ritual Ceremonies” seem to be something 
official or public.  If “the Ritual Ceremonies of the Imperial Palace” were official, this would directly 
conflict with the constitutional separation between religion and the state.  This kind of ambiguous 
treatment of “the Ritual Ceremonies in the Imperial Palace” could be understood as an example of 
Shimazono’s idea of State Shinto.
　 The English website also omits detailed description, but the Japanese website of the “Official Visits 
within Japan” contains various information (Gyōkōkei nado ［kokunai no odemashi］ 行幸啓など［国
内のお出まし］).  Among the general category of the “Official Visits within Japan,” one subcategory 
looks very interesting for the purpose of this article, which is senbotsusha irei戦没者慰霊 , which can 
be literally translated into “consolation of souls, or spiritual consolation, of the war dead,” roughly 
comparable to “commemoration of the war dead.” The current website of senbotsusha irei notes “four 
dates to remember annually” in addition to the list of the related historical visits of the emperor and 
empress under this subcategory around 1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of war, 2005, the 60th 
anniversary, and 2015, the 70th anniversary of the end of war.
　 The four dates to remember annually refer to June 23rd (Okinawa Memorial Day), August 6th 
(anniversary of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima), August 9th (anniversary of the atomic bombing 
in Nagasaki), and August 15th (anniversary of the end of war).  Akihito mentioned these four annual 
memorial days in 1981, saying that the Japanese should remember these four every year.  His attention 
to war experiences and the postwar experience under the U.S. occupation (1945―1972) of Okinawa 
traces back to an earlier year.  Akihito as crown prince visited Okinawa with Michiko for the first time 
11 The following description is based on the website of the Imperial Household Agency.
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in 1975.  During this visit, they experienced the extremists’ protest at the Himeyuri Cenotaph, and 
narrowly escaped a fire bomb hurled at them.
　 Their 1995 visits included Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Okinawa, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Memorial 
Hall, in addition to the visit to Iwo Jima in the previous year.  In 2005, the couple visited Saipan in 
Micronesia, a commonwealth of the United States.  Around the 70th anniversary, the couple visited 
Okinawa, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima in 2014, Palau in 2015, and the Philippines in 2016.  These visits of 
the royal couple apparently show their pacifist stance, and this pacifism seems to be entangled with their 
somehow “spiritual” or “soul-related” attitudes, as the category heading of the website of the Imperial 
Household Agency, senbotsusha irei, suggests.  As mentioned above in the citation of Shillony’s work, 
the liberal and pacifist leanings of the current emperor might have caused some disappointment or 
irritation among the conservative nationalists.  But around the 70th anniversary of the end of World 
War II, Akihito’s sincere remembrance of the war dead and sympathy with the war victims has been 
referred to in a somehow positive way in some journalistic venues.  The “spiritual” element in this 
pacifist attitude of the emperor and empress seemingly cannot be assimilated into ritual ceremonies 
conducted in a Shinto style.  If so, it would be desirable that this element should be dealt with in a 
distinctive way from the debate about postwar State Shinto.
　 At this point, we should turn our attention more to the image of the empress, in addition to the 
image of the emperor with the empress.  Some of the recent publications featuring Akihito and 
Michiko have the word inori (prayer) in their title.  If we only pick up the publications around 2015, 
here are three examples; a major female weekly magazine, Shūkan Josei週刊女性 , published a special 
January issue in a photo-album style to commemorate Michiko’s eightieth birthday (in 2014) entitled 
Kōgō Michiko-sama no inori to yorokobi皇后美智子さまの祈りと慶び (Prayer and joy of Empress 
Michiko).  This book contains the empress’s written messages on her eightieth birthday, photographs 
of her activities together with the emperor in 2013―2014, in addition to a historical album of photos 
taken since the 1960s.  Especially after the enthronement of Akihito in 1989, the subject of her prayers 
becomes more conspicuous, mainly because she made numerous journeys to the sites of natural 
disasters to visit and sympathize with survivors.  These sites of disasters include the eruption of 
Mount Unzen in 1991, the 1993 Hokkaido earthquake, the Great Hanshin earthquake in 1995, a series 
of eruptions on Miyake-jima from 2000 onwards and earthquakes in neighboring islands, the eruption 
of Mount Usu in 2000, the 2004 Chūetsu earthquake, the 2005 Fukuoka earthquake, the 2007 Chūetsu 
offshore earthquake, and the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake.
　 A second book to mention here is a collection of poems (waka 和 歌 , and other kinds) composed 
by the emperor and empress, entitled Tennō Kōgō ryōheika: Irei to inori no gyosei to miuta天皇皇后
両陛下　慰霊と祈りの御製と御歌 (Their majesties the emperor and empress: Their poetry of soul-
consolation and prayer).  The major part of this book is the thematic collection of Akihito and Michiko’s 
poems with annotations.  The authors Warita Takeo割田剛雄 and Kobayashi Takashi小林隆 sort their 
poems into the following twelve headings:
1．At the War Memorial for Fallen Sailors戦没船員の碑 in Kannonzaki観音崎 , Yokosuka
2．To congratulate the return of Okinawa to the Japanese administration in 1972
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3．At the Okinawa visit in 1975, including the visit to the 1975 Okinawa Expo
4．At the first visit to Okinawa as emperor and empress in 1993
5．At the visit to Iwo Jima in 1994 for irei
6．At the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war in 1995
7．For commemoration of the Tsushima-maru対馬丸 (a ship that sank)
8．For victims of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
9．For disabled veterans
10．For prisoners of war, both foreign and Japanese
11．At the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in the 2005, including the visit to Saipan
12．At the seventieth anniversary of the end of the war in 2015, including the visit to Peleliu Island, 
the Republic of Palau
　 Under these headings, 27 poems composed by the emperor and 18 by the empress are included. 
While the empress’s prayers in the above-mentioned first book are basically related to her visit to 
the survivors of natural disasters, the poems with prayers and irei collected in this second book are 
related to the commemoration of the war.
　 A third book worth mentioning is a photo collection entitled Tennō Kōgō ryōheika: Inori no tabiji天
皇皇后両陛下　祈りの旅路 (Their majesties the emperor and empress: Journeys of prayer), edited 
and published by NHK Shuppan.  This book seems to be a compilation of two sides of the royal 
couple’s prayers, one for the victims and survivors of natural disasters, and the other for the victims 
and survivors of the war, composed of two parts: Part 1, Visit to the Sites of Natural Disasters; and 
Part 2, Journeys for the Irei.  This book also contains Akihito and Michiko’s poems in addition to a 
number of photographs.  Besides that, Part 1 contains the emperor’s message delivered on March 
16th, 2011, and Part 2 contains, among others, his message in 2005 mentioning their visit to Saipan 
in the same year, and another in 2012 regarding Okinawa’s difficulty during and after the war.  The 
March 2011 message was delivered as a video message, and this was an epoch-making event.  Its 
official English translation by the Imperial Household Agency reads as follows:
I am deeply saddened by the devastating situation in the areas hit by the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean 
Earthquake, an unprecedented 9.0-magnitude earthquake, which struck Japan on March 11th. 
The number of casualties claimed by the quake and the ensuing tsunami continues to rise by the 
day, and we do not yet know how many people have lost their lives.  I am praying that the safety 
of as many people as possible will be confirmed.  My other grave concern now is the serious and 
unpredictable condition of the affected nuclear power plant.  I earnestly hope that through the all-
out efforts of all those concerned, further deterioration of the situation will be averted.
　 Relief operations are now under way with the government mobilizing all its capabilities, but, 
in the bitter cold, many people who were forced to evacuate are facing extremely difficult living 
conditions due to shortages of food, drinking water and fuel.  I can only hope that by making 
every effort to promptly implement relief for evacuees, their conditions will improve, even if only 
gradually, and that their hope for eventual reconstruction will be rekindled.  I would like to let you 
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know how deeply touched I am by the courage of those victims who have survived this catastrophe 
and who, by bracing themselves, are demonstrating their determination to live on.
　 I wish to express my appreciation to the members of the Self-Defense Forces, the police, the 
fire department, the Japan Coast Guard and other central and local governments and related 
institutions, as well as people who have come from overseas for relief operations and the members 
of various domestic relief organizations, for engaging in relief activity round the clock, defying the 
danger of recurring aftershocks.  I wish to express my deepest gratitude to them.
　 I have been receiving, by cable, messages of sympathy from the heads of state of countries 
around the world, and it was mentioned in many of those messages that the thoughts of the peoples 
of those countries are with the victims of the disaster.  These messages I would like to convey to the 
people in the afflicted regions.
　 I have been told that many overseas media are reporting that, in the midst of deep sorrow, the 
Japanese people are responding to the situation in a remarkably orderly manner, and helping each 
other without losing composure.  It is my heartfelt hope that the people will continue to work hand 
in hand, treating each other with compassion, in order to overcome these trying times.
　 I believe it extremely important for us all to share with the victims as much as possible, in 
whatever way we can, their hardship in the coming days.  It is my sincere hope that those who have 
been affected by the disaster will never give up hope and take good care of themselves as they live 
through the days ahead, and that each and every Japanese will continue to care for the afflicted 
areas and the people for years to come and, together with the afflicted, watch over and support their 
path to recovery.
(http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-okotoba/01/address/tohokujishin-h230316-mov.html)
　 According to The Asahi Shinbun article on December 8th, 2015 entitled “Irei no tabi, sanju koete慰
霊の旅　傘寿超えて ,” Hara Takeshi原武史 picks up the issue of this very message of the emperor 
as the critical moment, after which, according to Hara, a growing number of Japanese people turned to 
the Imperial House as the final source to depend on at this epoch-making moment in Japanese history. 
Akihito’s message, delivered on August 8th, 2016, mentioned in the beginning of this article, was the 
second occasion following this March 2011 message.
Conclusion
　 I have reviewed Yasumaru’s decidedly critical attitude toward the emperor system, and also 
Shillony’s complaints, together with others, against the current emperor and his family’s distance 
from ordinary people’s lives.  If we only pay attention to the most recent attitudes of the public toward 
Akihito and his family, the general image about them can be regarded as more favorable.  The cause 
of this favorable image may be at least partly attributed to Akihito and Michiko’s activities of irei and 
prayers.  And besides that, their sympathetic attitude to the victims and survivors of the 2011 Tōhoku 
earthquake in particular seems to have been very significant.
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　 As his August 2016 message clearly shows, Akihito considers praying for the people to be his 
first and foremost duty.  What kind of prayer do the current emperor and empress offer? Is this an 
example of a continuation or rebirth of State Shinto? It does not quite look as if this is so, because 
it is not really formulated in a Shinto style.  We cannot say nevertheless that these prayers are not 
religious at all.  The recent occasions of the royal couple’s prayers, one showing their pacifist stance 
at a number of war-related sites, and the other showing their sympathy with victims and survivors of 
natural disasters, seem to contain a somewhat religious aura, in that at least they sincerely pray.  In 
addition to the relation of the imperial family with Shinto, there are arguments about their relation 
with Christianity that Shillony discussed, and these prayers of the royal couple might contain some 
characteristics similar to Christian prayer.
　 The religious dimensions of the Imperial Household must have experienced various phases in the 
postwar years.  The activities of the current emperor and empress from 1989 onwards seem to have 
accumulated a certain religious meaning, and not those of a strictly Shinto style, in the numerous 
occasions of their visits to sites of natural disasters and to war-related sites.  It can be argued, as 
mentioned before, that through modernization, Japan experienced the secularization process step by 
step in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the Meiji Restoration period, and in the postwar 
occupation policy.  If we look at the most recent image of the current emperor and empress, the 
religious atmosphere surrounding them seems to be growing gradually.  We can probably say that 
here we see one element of the religious dimension of contemporary Japanese society.
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